I’ve just returned from a lovely four days in Madison with friends. We stuffed ourselves, saw two excellent movies (Nightcrawler and Attack The Block), sat around reading books, and talked late into the night. Here are some pictures.
Tag: Ted Chiang
As previously mentioned, graduate school was hell on my reading. To get back in the groove I resolved that this year I would read at least one book a week. Twelve weeks in, I’m ahead of schedule. Here are the first twenty books I’ve read this year. (Collage above made with this online tool.)
- The No. 1 Ladies’ Detective Agency by Alexander McCall Smith. This one failed to impress me, and I doubt I will read any other books in the series.
- Solaris: The Definitive Edition by Stanislaw Lem (audiobook). This is the new translation direct from Polish released in 2008. I’d tried to read the previous translation once, which was actually a retranslation from French, and found it unimpressive. I loved the direct translation, though, and can see why it’s held in such esteem among Lem’s works.
- Tuf Voyaging by George R. R. Martin. This is a reread, inspired by the book’s presence on Kevin Brockmeier’s list of his 50 favorite SFF books. I thought it delightful fun the first time, and I still feel that way about it. It’s a collection of linked short stories, but both times I’ve read it in a single sitting.
- The Book Thief by Markus Zusak. This is really a gorgeous, ambitious book. Carmen Machado loves it, and had been recommending it for a few years. The novel’s formal conceit is that it is narrated by Death, and while this is achieved with great sensitivity and beautiful language, my own lack of affection for Cartesian dualism means I found it less affecting than I otherwise might. I suspect that’s why I merely really liked it rather than loving it.
- Superman/Shazam: First Thunder by Judd Winick and Joshua Middleton. I was inspired to read this by Justin Pierce, who posted to Facebook a page from it in which Superman is furious when he learns that Captain Marvel is a transformed child. That scene was probably the best thing in the book, but it was fun.
- The Genocides by Thomas Disch. This is another one from Kevin’s list. It’s one of the bleakest books I’ve ever fully enjoyed. Humanity is uncomplicatedly eliminated as unseen aliens turn the planet into a monoculture for a genetically engineered crop. As unremitting an apocalypse as I’ve ever read.
- Arcadia by Tom Stoppard. This, as is obvious if you’ve clicked the very first link in the first paragraph, is a reread. I bought a bunch of copies of the play and threw a table reading party. We all drank mulled wine and hammed it up.
- Options by Robert Sheckley. After Van Choojitarom challenged people to come up with a novel odder than Voyage to Arcturus (which I still need to read), I offered this as a possibility. When I was 16 it seemed to me merely a memorably enthusiastic work of metafiction. Reading it now, though, it strikes me as an absurdist take on the difficulties of the creative process. Reading it makes me feel like I do when I’m struggling at the keyboard, and yet it’s entertaining. It’s also short enough that despite the overt metafictional elements, it doesn’t wear out its welcome. Might be my favorite Sheckley now. (Note if you’re planning to give it a shot, I’m pretty sure the opening few chapters intentionally read as terribly-written. Which is to say, I think they are well written, but in intentionally bad prose.)
- Childhood’s End by Arthur C. Clarke. Yet another from Kevin’s list. I read it as a kid and didn’t find it terribly impressive then, by Kevin’ and Jo Walton’s appreciation for the book convinced me to give it another chance. They were right. It’s really an excellent book, for all the reasons Jo outlines. Also, I realize I must have been under ten years old the last time I read it, because I remember thinking that if the events in the book were to happen, I would have been among the posthuman cohort.
- Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang by Kate Wilhelm. I’d never read one of her novels, and this one won the Hugo award in 1977, so seemed a good place to start. I didn’t enjoy it as much as I wanted to. I liked the opening section well enough, and the writing is good throughout, but I found culture of the clone generations unconvincing.
- Sarah Canary by Karen Joy Fowler. I love everything by Fowler I’ve ever read, which is several short stories and now three novels. This one is now my second favorite, behind We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, my favorite novel I read last year. Sarah Canary is lyrical and brilliant. Also, this is yet another one from Kevin’s list, which has yet to lead me astray.
- The Steps of the Sun by Walter Tevis. This is the last of Tevis’s science fiction novels that I hadn’t read, after reading The Man Who Fell to Earth and Mockingbird last year. I have yet to read anything by Tevis I don’t find engrossing, but this is a weird one. The opening I loved so much it seemed on pace to become a favorite, but toward the end the book takes a turn that I’m still trying to figure out my feelings toward. I still liked it, but I think less than the previous two.
- Bad Behavior by Mary Gaitskill. I’d read a few of these stories before, such as “Secretary” (the basis for the movie) and “A Romantic Weekend”(a favorite of mine), but never the whole collection. It’s good. Completely unsentimental psychological realism, full of obsessions and kinks. I’ve got another Gaitskill collection on deck for later.
- The Lifecycle of Software Objects by Ted Chiang. This was a reread that I assigned my science fiction writing class, in advance of Ted doing a Skype visit. I think this book is perfect.
- Hawkeye vol. 1 by Matt Fraction and David Aja. This was a gift from Matt when I visited Portland. It’s great fun, deserving of all the superlatives on the cover. Each issue is a tiny, clever action movie, the cleverest one from the point of view of a dog.
- The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen: Century: 2009 by Alan Moore and Kevin O’Neill. After Portland I find myself on a bit of a comics kick. This is the third of the Century volumes, and I didn’t enjoy it that much. Harry Potter as the antichrist was fun enough, but at this point LoEG seems more about enacting its conceit than about telling a story. Still, there were some nice tender scenes between Orlando and Mina.
- Weapons of the Metabarons by Alejandro Jodorowsky, Travis Charest, and Zoran Janjetov. A fairly forgettable addendum to an unforgettable series. I bought an omnibus collection of the original Metabarons series in Portland and will probably reread it soon.
- The Brief History of the Dead by Kevin Brockmeier. Kevin’s writing is beautiful. This book is about a city populated by everyone who is dead but still remembered by someone alive, and what happens to that city when everyone on Earth starts to die.
- Fourth Mansions by R. A. Lafferty. I bought this book on the strength of its chapter titles, which are things like “Now I will dismember the world with my hands” and “But I eat them up, Frederico, I eat them up.” This book was…strange. Not bad, but not good either. I’m not convinced that it is about anything except itself. It’s an internally consistent system of symbolism that doesn’t necessarily have any relevance to the real world. The language was very entertaining, but it’s verbal fireworks bursting above an insubstantial landscape.
- Nemo: Heart of Ice by Alan Moore and Kevin O’Neill. I liked this more than Century: 2009, because it’s more strongly narrative and because I enjoyed the H. P. Lovecraft and John Campbell references. Still a minor work, though.
Recently I was having a fun and interesting conversation with someone I’d just met, a clearly very bright person, and during our talk I commented that I’m a compatibilist determinist – someone who believes that free will and determinism are compatible concepts. My clearly very bright new friend dismissed the idea as obviously false. In fact, he trivially dismissed it; his immediate response was that claiming that free will and determinism are compatible didn’t even merit the weight of consideration he’d given the rest of the conversation.
I get that reaction a lot. Narratives about the future are almost always about how it is an unfixed fog of infinite possibility, crystalizing onto history and becoming solid in the flash of the present moment. Almost all time travel stories include the instance or threat of someone going back in the past and changing the future, positing an assumed indeterminist model of reality. In those very few (and usually very good) time travel stories that do take place in a deterministic universe, the discovery of the fixed nature of the future is usually treated as a tragic diminishment of possibility, an attack on free will. But outside of academic writing, free will is very rarely defined. My impression is that most people, even irreligious people, have a sort of vague sense of what they mean by “free will” that is inherently numinous, that free will is some ineffable quality by which we are masters of our own fate. When I’ve asked people to try to explicate to me what they mean when they say “free will,” they usually say something about the existence of choice, and free will being the thing that makes choices possible, and that choice is what gives life meaning. The notion that a fixed future annuls choice seems intuitively obvious.
It isn’t. Here I’d like to offer a fairly straightforward argument for why not.
Prologue: The Predictor
Consider the following hypothetical scenario conceived by Ted Chiang.1 Imagine that I gave you a toy, a little box the size of a remote for unlocking a car, called a Predictor. The Predictor has only a button, a small LED light, and some internal circuitry that I tell you has a built-in negative time delay. When you play with the Predictor, you find that the light always illuminates exactly one second before you push the button.
I give you a Predictor to play with, and at first if feels like a game, like the goal is to push the button right after you see the light flash. But if you try to break the rules, you find you can’t. If you try to press the button without having seen the light, no matter how fast you move it always flashes exactly one second before your finger gets there. If you try to wait for the light to flash, intending to not push the button after, then the light never turns on. There’s no way to fool the Predictor.
So, I’ve given you a toy that conclusively demonstrates that your future actions are already determined. Having played with this toy, the question is, do you stop feeding yourself? Or paying your bills? Or caring for your family? You’ve been shown a demonstration that the events of the future are, in principle, precisely determinable from the present. It either is or is not true, already, that you will feed yourself, get dressed, pay your bills, bathe your children, etc. So do you think that you, the person reading this article, would stop doing those things after I gift you a small toy? If you don’t believe that you would stop, then you have some intuition that a fatalist attitude of defeated meaninglessness is not a necessary consequence of determinism. It remains for me to motivate exactly why that might be, and to convince you that your choice to continue doing things like feeding yourself is, in fact, a choice, despite the revealed deterministic nature of the world. I will try to do that now, then return to this hypothetical example.
1. Definitions
Let’s get the terms out of the way.2 As used here, determinism is the notion that at any given moment the physics of the universe admits only a single possible future.
Choice is a little more complicated. When I use the terms “choice” or “decision,” I am referring to categories of actions undertaken by specific agents. For these choices to be free, they must be caused strictly by processes internal to the agent, but that alone is not a sufficient definition. Taking people to be the agents in question, there are plenty of actions that people perform for reasons that are strictly internal, but are not volitional. (Sneezing, for example, or breathing while asleep.) So let us say that an action is a choice or decision if and only if it is caused by the agent’s beliefs and desires.
This definition still admits some quibbling. How are we to consider, for example, addiction? It motivates action based on beliefs and desires, but we feel in some sense that the desires have been warped by an external factor. Similarly with compulsion, where we feel that desire has been warped by a non-volitional internal factor. So let us even more narrowly define a free choice: a choice is free if and only if (1) the agent would have acted differently had it so chosen, (2) the action was voluntary (unaffected by internal restraint), (3) the action was uncoerced (unaffected by external restraint).
It’s worth noting that if we consider things like addiction and compulsion to be, in some fashion, an adulteration of free will, then seeing such things exist in human beings lends credence to the mechanistic description of free will that I am going to develop. But what do I, specifically, mean by “free will?” Let us describe an agent as having free will if and only if the agent possesses the ability to perform deliberative processes that result in choice.
2. A Brief Hearing for Indeterminism
Let’s look quickly at the notion of free will in the absence of determinism. Imagine, instead, that the future is completely independent of the present, that there is no causal relationship between this present moment and the one to come. What, then, does choice consist of? If there is no causal relationship between the present and the future, then, as David Hume noted, any attempt to make an informed choice as to how you should act in pursuit of a goal is futile. In the purely indeterminist case, past experience is not a logical guide for future behavior. So rather than free will being obviously incompatible with determinism, it is in fact pure indeterminism that trivially excludes the existence of free will. Choice can not exist in a universe where the future is random. Choice requires some degree of causal relationship between past, present, and future.
“Some degree,” though, is a quibble phrase. Perhaps, one might argue, the universe is determinist-ish. It’s predictable enough for choice to exist, but not perfectly predictable. Perfect predictability, one might wish to argue, also excludes free will. If one wishes to take this perspective, then one has to answer the question: at what point does the somewhat predictable universe become too predictable for free will to exist? I will now argue that choice can exist even in a purely deterministic universe, sliding that boundary point right off the scale.
3. Deliberative Process as Physical Event
Posit that we exist in a perfectly deterministic universe, and consider the case where you throw a ball at my face. If I am asleep–eyes closed, largely insensitive to my environment–then you are very likely to hit me. If I am awake–eyes open, watching your throw–then you are unlikely to hit me. (What do I mean though, in this deterministic universe, by “likely” and “unlikely?” I’ll address that more later. For now, let’s say that if we repeated many trials with slightly varying contextual conditions, in most of the cases where you throw the ball at my face while I’m asleep you hit me, and in most of the cases where you do so when I’m awake, you miss.) I am, when awake, able to avoid the ball, using faculties unavailable to me when I am asleep. I am able to avoid the ball, but I don’t have to do so. If, say, you’ve thrown a ball at my face because we are playing baseball, I might perceive some advantage in allowing it to hit me. That is to say, I might avoid avoiding the ball. I’m able to do this because our species has evolved sensory apparatus (sight, proprioception) that allows me to know when projectiles are coming at my head and move out of the way. When those apparatus are nonfunctional, such as when I’m asleep, I can’t move out of the way.
Events that I have the capacity to perceive and avoid are what Daniel Dennett likes to call evitable3 (to distinguish from those that are inevitable). Now, you may be objecting, “the universe was posited to be deterministic. Whether or not the ball hits your face was already determined the moment it leaves my hand. That makes it inevitable.” To which I would respond: inevitable to whom? It is clearly not inevitable to me; as the baseball/non-baseball example shows, whether or not the ball hits me is influenced by my beliefs and desires. Perhaps you mean inevitable to the universe. But that is not a meaningful notion, the universe is not a volitional agent. It does not make sense to speak of the universe avoiding, or avoiding avoiding.
The motions I make with my body after you throw the ball at me result from a cascade of electrochemical events in my brain, which correspond to my weighing the desirability of the ball hitting my face, the position of my body, how I would have to move to avoid the ball, etc. This electrochemical cascade, this physical event, is itself a deliberative process, one that results me choosing to dodge or not dodge the ball. All of my initial definitions for free will have now been met: I am an agent possessed of the ability to engage in deliberative processes that result in the perpetration of a choice: decision to dodge or not dodge the ball. That decision is definitionally a choice, in that it is an action caused by my beliefs and desires, where my beliefs are my sensory/conceptual model of the world, and my desires are my internal preferences. It even meets the more restrictive definition of being a free choice. The fact that the dodge or the hit was already extant in the future when the ball left your hand is irrelevant. The free choice was already extant, too.
I know of no logically coherent way to define freedom of choice that is incompatible with choice as an event that can occur within a deterministic universe. As long as choice is a behavior arising from a deliberative process, it is compatible with determinism. Thus free will, as I have defined it, is also compatible with determinism.
4. The Issue of Counterfactuals
One reason that it seems (incorrectly) to many people that determinism is incompatible with choice is that our deliberative processes which result in choice involve the consideration of counterfactuals. We think to ourselves, “What would be true if I did X? What would be true if I did Y? How likely is it that any action I take will result in Z?” This notion of likeliness seems to be challenged by determinism. How can one meaningfully think of things being likely or unlikely if the future is already determined? But in truth there is no contradiction. When we utilize counterfactuals in our deliberative processes, we are conducting mental simulations based on our beliefs and our understanding of past experiences. Our ability to judge how likely we think something is does not depend on what actually later occurs. The mental events of simulation and prediction are just part of the deliberative process that results in choice.
We talk about counterfactuals in a confusing way, though. If I am standing at the free throw line on a basketball court, and I shoot a free throw that bounces off the rim, I might be heard to say, “I could have made that.” What does that statement mean? I’m not actually saying that if everything about the state of myself and the world were somehow exactly the same down to the minutest detail, and the situation were to recur, I would make the shot. Rather, I’m making a claim about counterfactuals. I’m saying that among the family of possible worlds admitting minute variations of the air, moisture on the ball, potential gradients along the ion channels of the cells in my muscles; in many of those possible worlds I make the shot. Here again, the fact that when I took the shot there was only one physically possible future does not invalidate my counterfactual analysis. Just as it is meaningful to say that it is, was, and always will be the case that I missed the shot, it is also meaningful to say that I (counterfactually) could have made it. It is simply semantic ambiguity that makes these two notions seem to be in conflict.
Epilogue: The Predictor, Again
So let’s go back to the case of the Predictor. If I were to gift to you a tiny toy that happened, by implication, to demonstrate that the future already existed, of course you wouldn’t stop feeding yourself, or paying your bills, or acting in the interest of others you care for. You do these things because you believe they matter, and make choices motivated by that belief. The only reason for your choices to change would be if your beliefs fundamentally changed. Maybe you’ve been previously convinced, for no good reason, that determinism would mean that nothing matters. Then playing with the Predictor might be dangerous. You might then, as some people in Ted’s story do, choose to abdicate all personal responsibilities and never do anything again. But that’s not the Predictor’s fault, nor the universe’s; it’s the fault of you having “determinism = meaninglessness” in your head as a disabling, destructive narrative . That would be a tragedy if it were to happen–but why should it? The Predictor is just a small piece of plastic that you can throw in the trash if you want4, and anyway, reading this has taken a long time and you’re hungry. Might as well go eat something.
In his story “What’s Expected of Us,” Nature, 2005 ↩
I’m indebted for portions of this section to Curtis Brown, my symbolic logic professor at Trinity University. ↩
Dennett discusses evitable and inevitable events at length in his book Freedom Evolves, which is a much more learned and thorough explanation of compatibilist determinism than this article. ↩
All of the discussion up to this point has been about a hypothetical universe that I simply posited at the start was deterministic. I haven’t made any claims about the actual reality you and I inhabit, nor have I placed a tiny plastic Predictor in your hand. And, of course, I can’t. They don’t really exist. But I think I can give you something that is very close to the same.
Special relativity has as one of its basic results that simultaneity does not have any meaning across reference frames. The math for this isn’t too complicated, but instead of writing out equations, here’s a two minute video that clearly demonstrates the phenomenon.
There are many versions of this thought experiment, but the one in the video is the one Einstein proposed. As you can see in the video, the man on the platform sees the bolts of lightning strike both ends of the train simultaneously, and the woman riding in the train sees lighting first strike the front of the train, and then strike the back of the train. And neither person is wrong. In the man’s frame of reference, the strikes were simultaneous. In the woman’s, one came before the other.
Special relativity has been experimentally confirmed time after time. As theories go, it’s one we are as sure of as we are sure of anything at all. Consequently it is already widely accepted that simultaneity as a concept has no meaning across reference frames. But lets think through the implications: the man on the platform observes an event that, at the time he observes it, is still in the woman on the train’s future. That is to say, there exist an event–the lightning striking the back of the train–that is in the man’s past, and in the woman’s future. Thus it is possible for a physical event that is already in my past to still be in your future. But the past is unchangeable. Anything that is in the past, for anyone, is necessarily a thing that happened in the universe. But if my unchangeable past can be your future, that means that an event in your future is determined. And this reasoning can, in principle, apply to any arbitrary event. Therefore the future already exists, and the events of the future are already determined.
Conclusion: special relativity implies that the universe in which we live is, in fact, deterministic. ↩
New things for you to read!
- The incomparable Ted Chiang has a new story up at Subterranean. This one is titled “The Truth of Fact, The Truth of Feeling,” and is about language, writing, and memory.
- My clever friend Ben Mauk wrote an essay on Amazon.com’s entry into online arts sales that was published by The New Yorker.
- Carmen Machado had a story published in Tin House back in July that I neglected to link to. This one is called “Miss Laura’s School for Esquire Men.”
This was my first SF convention, and was something of a test to see if I could enjoy conventions of any kind. Last summer, while I was in San Diego for Clarion, I went to ComiCon, which managed to awaken an inner agoraphobe the existence of which I had not previously suspected. But a week later Nalo Hopkinson made me promise to attend WisCon, assuring me I would find it a valuable experience. Boy, was she ever right.
Day 1:
Kat, Keffy, and I drove to Madison from Minneapolis, in Kat’s VW Beetle. I rode in the back, and slept part of the way, waking up in time to see our entry into the city. We checked in to the Concourse hotel, then wandered out into downtown until we found a restaurant that wanted to fill us with post-road-trip margaritas. Then it was back to the hotel, where we visited the Dealer Room (where I discovered that attempting to talk to Ted Chiang turned me into a stuttering fool, albiet one able to correctly identify literary influences), then wandered around until it was time for the opening ceremonies. I managed to catch Geoff Ryman, Guest of Honor and one of our Clarion teachers, as he was coming in the door, and we monopolized his attention until the stage manager for the opening ceremonies came and asked if we wouldn’t mind terribly letting the GoH go to take part in the Con programming. There was a skit, which was mildly entertaining but was completely overshadowed by Geoff and Ellen Klages spontaneously making out with each other.
After the opening ceremonies, Keffy had a panel. “TYRANNOSAURS IN F-14S!!!!” on the topic of SF that is so bad that it’s good. The discussion focused mostly on television and movies. The consensus opinion was that books generally don’t fall into the “so bad it’s good” category for most people because (a) books lack the audiovisual component that, when done well, can act as foils for a weak story, and (b) the time investment required to read a book is usually enough greater than the time to watch a movie that they are held to a higher standard. After Keffy’s panel the programming of interest was over and we were off to the parties, where we met Jed Hartman and had a reunion with Mary Anne Mohanraj, another of our Clarion teachers. We didn’t stay at the parties long, though, as we were all exhausted.
Day 2:
Breakfast was had at a coffee and crepes place we found called Bradbury’s, which struck us as an appropriately SFnal name. Then Kat and I went to Ellen Klages’s Guest of Honor reading while Keffy went to another panel. We met up again in the Dealer’s Room to find, among other things, the new issue of Sybil’s Garage, which contains Keffy’s first publication. Then Kat went to have lunch with Ellen Kushner and Delia Sherman, Keffy went to moderate a panel, “Keeping Up With Science,” and I went to another panel, “What’s in the Air?” with Geoff, Jed, Neil Rest, and Kristine Smith, which was about how techonlogy will be changing human society in the near-term future. My favorite comment from that one was made by a textile preservationist named (I think) Laura who observed that a post-privacy technological society might have more in common, in terms of interpersonal relationships, with a pre-technological small town than it does with the modern day. When that panel was over I went to a reading by, among others, Ellen Ku. and Delia. The reading was notable as the only Con programming at which I encoutered people being assholes: a pair came in late and sat behind me, whispering loudly about how it was “happening again” and “rude to the real writers.” As it happened, the Con program was printed before the full lineup for the reading was finalized, and the first reader wasn’t listed (though her name was on the sign outside the door). So the natural thing to do, at least in the minds of the people behind me, was to stand up and interrupt her mid-sentence to say, “When are the writers who are actually scheduled going to be reading?” Ellen Kushner smacked them down.
After the reading I went to “How Should Magazines and Anthologies Review Submissions?” with Mary Anne, Susan Marie Groppi (EIC of Strange Horizons, a letter from whom I have framed on the wall of my office), John Joseph Adams, Sumana Harihareshwara, Deb Taber, and Adrian Alan Simmons. The best thing about this panel was getting to meet Susan, Sumana, and Deb, with whom I would find myself interacting more as the Con progressed. I also learned from J. J. Adams that when F&SF takes a long time to get back to you, it is generally a good thing. (As of this writing they’ve had a story I sent them for eight weeks.) After the panel the group got together again for the Tiptree auction, which was one of the most entertaining events I’ve ever attended. Highlights included a Geoff Ryman striptease act and a group recitation of a hilariously queer award from Ellen Klages’s childhood.
Day 3:
Again began the day with breakfast at Bradbury’s. Then Keffy went to “Keeping the S in SF,” and Kat and I attended “The Kids’ Books That Made Us,” after which we went to the art room to pick up a print Kat had purchased. I ended up buying a different print by the same artist, Ingrid Kallick. “Giant” whispered to me as I walked past it that it was actually a short story masquerading as a piece of visual art, and really needed to come home with me so I could write it.
As we were leaving the art room, Ellen Kushner invited us to lunch with her and Delia. We tracked down Keffy and headed out to an Afghani restaurant. On the way we ran into Mary Anne, Ben Rosenbaum, and Mary Kowal, and the group grew. And then seemed to grow some more, until Ellen turned around and announced, “I don’t do twelve person lunches.” The final tally ended up at nine. From lunch Keffy went to be on “The Obligatory Workshop Panel,” and Kat and I went to hear Geoff’s Guest of Honor reading, after which was what turned out to be my favorite event at WisCon: the Strange Horizons Tea Party.
At the Tea Party I managed to drop all of my social anxiety for perhaps the only time during the Con. I finally met my editor on “Husbandry,” Karen Meisner, who I had been looking for all weekend. We hit it off quite well. I excitedly related my Con activities, and she, amused, told me that I was imbuing ubiquitous experiences with the wide-eyed wonder of a neophyte. She also tracked down and introduced me to Meghan McCarron, who I had been wanting to meet and of whose writing I am a huge fan. I stayed for the whole party and then some, sweating profusely and chatting incessantly. I also met Alice Kim, Eric Vogt, and Jennifer I-Didn’t-Get-Her-Last-Name. Sadly, the Tea Party did eventually end, and I went back to my room to clean up for the Guest of Honor speeches and Tiptree presentation.
Before we went to WisCon I decided that my friends needed to experience the joy that is a polyester robe with dragons on, so I got them each one as a gift. We donned them before heading down to the ceremony, in preparation for the fancy dress party later than night.
We wandered into the big conference hall which had been set up like a dining room, and Ben Rosenbaum gestured us over to the table where Jed, Mary Anne, and Sumana were already sitting. We listened with them to the speeches, and then to the presentation of the Tiptree award to Nisi Shawl (Patrick Ness was unable to be there to accept his; Geoff read a letter from him). Then, this years Guests of Honor having been given there full due in accordance with WisCon tradition, the Guests of Honor for next year were announced. They will be Nnedi Okorafor and… Mary Anne Mohanraj! We all completely lost our shit, gawking at each other and, when she came back, hugging Mary Anne. We trailed along behind her, taking pictures and freaking out for about the next hour, then bounced around the parties for perhaps another hour or two before heading back to the room and crashing.
Day 4:
Due to the exigencies of flight schedules and other non-WisCon committments, we got up early and left without taking part in any of the final day’s programming. But I think we all felt that we got our money’s worth. I pretty much can’t wait to go again next year.
Ted Chiang has a story, “Exhalation,” up for a Hugo award this year. It was originally published in the anthology Eclipse 2, and now Night Shade Books has made it available for download. I just read it, and loved it. It is in structure and tone very similar to one of my very favorite short stories, “The Library of Babel” by Jorge Luis Borges. In fact, the similarities are such that I wonder if Borges was a direct inspiration. Compare the first lines.
Borges: “The universe (which others call the Library) is composed of an indefinite, perhaps infinite, series of hexagonal galleries.”
Chiang: “It has long been said that air (which others call argon) is the source of life.”
Additionally, both stories end with the narrator drawing comfort from imagining a universe which extends beyond what is commonly conceived of as the boundaries of the one he inhabits. Borges’s story uses combinatorial complexity as the basis of its thematic explorations, while Chiang’s uses the laws of thermodynamics. Basically, Chiang has written the physics-y version of my favorite math-y story ever, and has thus made my inner scientist very happy.